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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Price Discrimination-Section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act-
The Liberation of the Functional Intermediary
The genesis of section 2 (c),1 the "brokerage clause" of the Rob-
inson-Patman Act,' lay in the conviction that the mass purchasing
power of large chain stores was being employed to coerce from sup-
pliers the payment of brokerage or extension of discounts in lieu of
brokerage which were not earned due to the absence of performance
of any brokerage service by these direct buying purchasers.3 It was
feared that such "dummy brokerage" would drive the small buyer,
who was unable to obtain these illusory payments from a seller, to eco-
nomic extinction. Recent judicial and administrative interpretations
have worked at least a partial metamorphosis in the status of this
section 4 which at one time was considered to be the most settled
area of this notoriously unsettled statute.'
Section 2(a),6 the general "price discrimination" provision of
149 Stat. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1958). Section 2(c) declares
it to be unlawful for "any person... to pay or grant, or to receive or accept,
anything of value as a commission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any
allowance or discount in lieu thereof, except for services rendered in con-
nection with the sale or purchase of goods... either to the other party to such
transaction or to an agent... or other intermediary therein where such inter-
mediary is acting in ... behalf.., of any party to such transaction other
than the person by whom such compensation is so granted or paid."
'The Robinson-Patman Act, the "price discrimination law," amends § 2
of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
' See FINAL REPORT OF THE CHAIN STORE INVESTIGATION, S. Doc. No. 4,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1935); H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7
(1936); S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936); 80th CONG. REC.
3114, 3116, 6281 (1936) (remarks by Senator Logan). On the legislative
background of § 2(c) see ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBIN-
SON-PATMAN ACT 332-37 (1962); Oppenheim, Administration of the Broker-
age Provision of the Robinson-Patman Act, 8 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 511, 516-
20 (1940).
'See FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166 (1960); Thomasville
Chair Co. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1962); Edward Joseph Hruby,
TRADE REG. REP. 16225 (FTC Dkt. 8068, 1963).
'Prior to the revolution in the construction of § 2(c), one commentator
had said: "Section 2(c) is undoubtedly the most ambiguous and faultily
drafted section of the Act. Yet, surprisingly enough, it is the only section
as to which no important question of interpretation still remains unsettled."
AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE Ron-
INSON-PATMAN ACT 106 (2d rev. ed. 1959).
changed, this would seem an insufficient reason to grant appraisal rights as
a49 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958). Section 2(a) provides: "That
it shall be unlawful... to discriminate in price between different purchasers
of commodities of like grade and quality... where the effect of such discrim-
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the act, requires for an actionable violation both a discrimination
in price7 and a resulting competitive injury.' Prima facie violations
are subject inter alia to the defenses of (1) "cost justification,"
based on a showing that the lower price was justified by lower costs
of manufacture, sale or delivery and (2) a good faith meeting of a
competitor's price.10 In contrast with section 2 (a), section 2 (c) was
deemed to unqualifiedly prohibit receipt of payments by a buyer or
his agent from a seller, thus eliminating the possibility of employing
any of the defenses which section 2(a) provides," and making such
payments per se illegal. 2 The section contains one possible quali-
fication, the "except for services rendered" clause, which seemed to
present a defense to an illegal brokerage charge. This qualification,
ination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monop-
oly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition
with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such
discrimination, or with customers of either of them: Provided, That nothing
herein contained shall prevent differentials which make only due allowance
for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from
the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such
purchasers sold or delivered."
"FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960); Atlas Bldg. Prod.
Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1959); cert.
denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960). For a thorough discussion of the conflicting
views as to what constituted a price discrimination prior to the Anheuser-
Busch case, see RowE, PRIcE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PAT-
MAN AcT 92-107 (1962).
8FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., supra note 7; FTC v. Morton Salt Co.,
334 U.S. 37 (1948). These two cases contrast the differing requirements
for "injury to competition" at the seller's level and the customer's level.
' See Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953) ; Minneapolis-
Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. dis-
missed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952).
10 This defense is derived from the § 2(b) proviso which declares: "That
nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima facie
case thus made by showing that his lower price ... to any purchaser...
was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor."
49 Stat. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1958). This section has created
much controversy as to the extent of the defense allowed therein, but it has
been construed to give an absolute defense to a charge of price discrimina-
tion, even though there exists a competitive injury in the transaction under
consideration.
"
1E.g., FTC v. Washington Fish & Oyster Co., 271 F.2d 39 (9th Cir.
1959); Oliver Bros. v. FTC, 102 F.2d 763 (4th Cir. 1949); Southgate
Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 774
(1945).
1 The words "other than brokerage" originally followed the words "differ-
ences in costs" in § 2(a), but they were stricken and this was construed to
mean that § 2(c) was to be completely independent of § 2(a) with no § 2(a)
defenses allowed. Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC, 96 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 305 U.S. 634 (1938).
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however, was emasculated in the first cases to be presented to the
courts charging a section 2(c) violation"3 by holding, in effect, that
as a matter of law a buyer or his agent could not render any services
to a seller.
Perhaps the harshest of the earlier section 2(c) decisions arose
not in the context of a direct buying chain or an independent inter-
mediary but in a case dealing with a "buying broker."' 4 In South-
gate Brokerage Co. v. FTC,5 defendant company which did a large
brokerage business also purchased goods on its own account, re-
selling to wholesalers who paid the same price to the seller that they
would have paid had they purchased through a broker. On its direct
purchases Southgate received by way of discount the same commis-
sion which it received in its brokerage operations. Again it was
held that under no circumstances could a buyer "render services" to
a seller.' 6 The court further emphasized that lack of discriminatory
effect among buyers was wholly irrelevant due to the independence
of sections 2(a) and 2(c).'
Because violations of section 2(c) were interpreted to be illegal
per se, it became a prime target for critics of the Robinson-Patman
Act. 8 The most repeated charge was that it fostered "soft compe-
" Webb-Crawford Co. v. FTC, 109 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1940) ; Great Atl.
& Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S.
625 (1940); Oliver Bros. v. FTC, 102 F.2d 763 (4th Cir. 1939); Biddle
Purchasing Co. v. FTC, supra note 12. The rationale of these cases is that
true brokerage services can be rendered only by an agent of the party pay-
ing the fee, and that consequently a buying and selling service cannot be
rendered by the same party in the same transaction. Thus when a brokerage
fee reaches the buyer, it is nothing more than a rebate or discount in price.
The basis of this rationale is grounded on the theory that the seller strives
to sell at the highest possible price and the buyer to buy at the lowest--clearly
neither is in any way attempting to render a service to the other.
" The term "buying broker" is used to denote an intermediary who,
in addition to acting as a "pure" broker, buys goods for his own account,
taking title to them and assuming all risks commensurate thereto. This type
of activity is particularly prevalent in the South where the "buying broker"
resells as a distributor to low volume wholesalers or small retailers, neither of
which have the requirements or credit status to enable them to directly buy
substantial quantities. This mode of distribution has also been utilized to a
great extent by packers of fish products. See generally EDWARDS, THE PRICE
DISCRIMINATION LAW 140-47 (1959).
15 150 F.2d 607 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 326 U.S. 774 (1945).
16Accord, In re Whitney & Co., 273 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1959).
'
7 Accord, FTC v. Washington Fish & Oyster Co., 271 F.2d 39 (9th Cir.
1959).
1" See EDWARDS, THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAW 150-52 (1959) ; ROWE,
PIcE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 539 (1962);
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tition"' 0 and created an island of immunity for independent brokers
in that they had a monopoly in their distributive function. The
effect was a legal disqualification of all but the "pure" broker's serv-
ices resulting in an inhibition of new distributional methods 2 and
actually placing the Robinson-Patman Act at odds with the broader
antitrust objective of vigorous competition. 21 Recommendations for
remedial action2' ranged from complete legislative repeal of the sec-
tion and allowance of this area to be treated under section 2(a) 2
to judicial overruling of the past precedents, based on a more per-
ceptive approach to the realities of business.24
Adleman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 HARV. L. REv.
1289, 1335-37 (1948); Kelly, Functional Discounts under the Robinson-
Patman Act, 40 CALIF. L. Rnv. 526, 553 (1952); Oppenheim, Administration
of the Brokerage Provision of the Robinson-Patman Act, 8 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 511, 536-40 (1940).
1 RowE, op. cit. supra note 18, at 539-40; Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust
Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 MIcH. L.
Rnv. 1139, 1207 (1952).
2 E.g., Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 774 (1945). Disallowance of discounts to the distributor
in that case, as payments in lieu of brokerage, would lead one to conclude that
the field of distributional intermediaries was forever pre-empted by the tra-
ditional wholesaler, jobber, and independent broker. This conclusion has
happily had its foundations shaken by Edward Joseph Hruby, TRADE REG.
REP. " 16225 (FTC Dkt. 8068, 1963).
" See ATr'y GEN. NAT'rL COM. ANTITRUST REP. 190-93 (1955). This
report emphasized that the essence of antitrust policy in distribution is to insure
that the consumer benefits by vigorous competition along each step of the
way. Yet, it noted, § 2(c) as then interpreted invalidated the genuine func-
tions performed by business men who had invested capital and services in
the middleman's phase of the marketing process unless they were "inde-
pendent" brokers. This clogged competition in the channels of distribution
by the creation of a legal monopoly for the "independent" broker.
"2 One writer has exculpated the Commission and the courts for their
interpretations of the brokerage clause on the ground that they have followed
the Congressional intent to the letter. 100 U. PA. L. REv. 107, 118 (1951).
However, Rowe takes a contrary stand in that the Commission has in the
"run-of-the-mine" § 2(c) case "hoisted puny respondents from the back
waters of business," rather than pursuing mass purchasing, direct buying,
firms of national stature, which were originally the targets of the section's
restrictions. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN
AcT 539-40 (1962).
" EDwARDS, THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAw 643-45 (1959); ATr'y
GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 192-93 (1955); Oppenheim, Federal
Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50
MICH. L. Rnv. 1139, 1206-07 (1952). The Attorney General's Committee's
recommendation for legislative change was based on the fact that it deemedjudicial reconsideration impossible due to numerous appellate adjudications
which affirmed the Commission's previous restrictive holdings.
" See ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN
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After years of conscientious enforcement of section 2(c) and
unanimity of interpretation by the Commission and the lower courts,
what ultimately has proved to be the first breakthrough in the per se
construction of section 2(c) came in the 1960 decision of FTC v.
Henry Broch & Co.,25 the first section 2(c) case to reach the
Supreme Court. There an independent broker reduced his fee to a
supplier in order to enable the supplier to meet the buyer's offered
price. In a five to four decision the court held that section 2(c) ap-
plied under these circumstances26 and that the reduction in price
amounted to an allowance in lieu of brokerage. In the course of the
opinion the court stated:
This is not to say that every reduction in price coupled with a re-
duction in brokerage automatically compels the conclusion that an
allowance "in lieu" of brokerage has been granted. Whether such
a reduction is tantamount to a discriminatory payment of broker-
age depends on the circumstances of each case.27
The court held that this reduction in brokerage was made to obtain
the particular order involved and, therefore, was discriminatory.28
The thread of qualifying language running throughout the ma-
jority opinion provoked the dissent into concluding that the ma-
jority had created a fusion between section 2(a) and section 2(c)
AcT ch. 17 (1962), for a comprehensive comment on the administration of
the Act where he recommends a judicial harmonization of the Robinson-
Patman Act and the antitrust laws via a more flexible approach by the courts
and a "quarantine" of the absolute liabilities of the brokerage provision. Cf.,
Edwards, Book Review, 111 U. PA. L. Ruv. 258 (1962).25363 U.S. 166 (1960).
0The dissent was of the opinion that § 2 (c) did not apply to this transac-
tion because it did not in any way involve a payment br allowance for 'services
claimed to have been performed by the buyer or his intermediary. It was felt
that the reduction involved should be tested under § 2(a) thereby permitting
it to be cost justified. Id. at 182-84.2TId. at 175-76. (Emphasis added).8It is important to note that the majority expressly disclaimed any fusion
of §§ 2(a) and 2(c) in requiring a "discrimination" before a reduction in
price in brokerage coupled with a reduction in price would compel the con-
clusion that there had been an allowance in lieu of brokerage. Id. at 176.
The dissenting commissioner in Edward Joseph Hruby, TRADE REG. REP.
16225 (FTC Dkt. 8068, 1963) apparently agreed with this disclaimer in
arriving at his conclusion that §§ 2(c) and 2(a) were not fused as a result
of the dictum in Broch. He was of the opinion that the only purpose that
the Broch majority had in pointing out that the reduction in commission
was there effectuated to obtain that particular order, was merely to emphasize
the fact that there was "an allowance in lieu of brokerage."
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thereby weakening the per se thrust that Congress had intended that
section 2 (c) should have.29
The dissenters in Brock proved to be prophetic, for in Thomas-
ville Chair Co. v. FTC3" the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
seized upon that conditioning dictum of the Broch majority to further
enfeeble the per se illegality approach to section 2(c). There a
furniture manufacturer classified its customers into two accounts.
The jobber accounts consisted of those who purchased at least
50,000 dollars worth of merchandise a year while those who bought
less than that amount were classified as carload accounts. Over a
period of some thirty-five years the jobber accounts had received an
over-all five per cent discount from the price paid by the carload ac-
counts. This discount was due partly to the fact that salesmen's
commissions were three per cent less on jobber accounts than on car-
load accounts. The court held that the Commission was in error in
holding that a reduction in price coupled with a reduction in com-
missions was a conclusive violation of section 2 (c) unless the entire
five per cent reduction could be justified by a cost savings exclusive
of the commission differential.3" It was concluded that in addition
to inquiring into the matter of correct customer classification, 2 the
Commission should consider whether the difference in commission
rates was justified by savings in costs to the salesmen in selling to
*" The dissent was not alone in this conclusion, for several writers com-
mented upon the possible unsettling effects that the language of the majority
might have on the past § 2(c) interpretation. See RowF, PRICE DISCRIMINA-
TION UNDER THE RoBINSON-PATMAN AcT 331, 344-45 (1962); Michael,
Brokerage and the Robinson-Patman Act, 10 LOYOLA L. REV. 165, 175 (1960-
61); 46 IOWA L. REV. 700 (1961); 13 STAN. L. REV. 133 (1960).
- 306 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1962); 43 B.U.L. REv. 427 (1963); 51 CAL1a.
L. REV. 215 (1963).
" See Thomasville Chair Co., 55 FTC 2076, 2077 (1959). The Commis-
sion had based its opinion on well-engrained precedent in citing Great AtI. &
Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F2d 667 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S.
625 (1940); Oliver Bros. v. FTC, 102 F.2d 763 (4th Cir. 1939); Biddle
Purchasing Co. v. FTC, 96 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 634
(1938).
"' The "quantity discount" given here to the larger volume customers is
an approved method of differentiating prices charged, if such price differences
can be cost-justified. The discount brackets into which customers are placed
must be neither unreasonably broad nor unrelated to cost savings attributable
to the size of shipments and must further be actually available to all cus-
tomers. See Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 985




jobber customers. To substantiate this conslusion the court relied
heavily on the Broch dictum and stated:
[A] s we read it, the court's opinion [in Broch] says that a reduc-
tion in price, giving effect to reduced commissions paid by the
seller are violations of section 2 (c) only if such reduction in price
is "discriminatory." We read this to mean "without justification
based on bona fide differences in the costs of sales resulting from
the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are
sold or delivered." 83
Although done in a somewhat ambiguous manner, a court for the
first time in a case involving section 2(c) required a finding of a
"discrimination" and allowed the defense of cost-justification, both
of which were heretofore applied exclusively to section 2 (a) cases34
The third leg of the "new 2(c)" approach made its appearance
in the recent FTC proceedings against Edward Joseph Hruby3 5 The
facts of this case are essentially the same as those in Southgate. Like
the respondent there, Hruby acted in some transactions as a broker,
while in others he purchased goods on his own account. The initial or-
der charged Hruby with receipt of allowances in lieu of brokerage ;31
however, the Commission ruled that his operations placed him at a
functional level midway between the producer of the goods and the
wholesalers to whom he gold. The lower price that he received re-
flected not a saving in brokerage, but rather the difference in the
33 306 F.2d at 545. In FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960),
the Supreme Court held that a mere price differential was tantamount to a
"price discrimination." However, in the quoted language here the circuit
court seems to be at variance with the Supreme Court's definition in that it
has synonymized lack of discrimination with the defense of cost justification.
" The Commission has announced its non-acquiescense in Thomasville
Chair and has stated that it now reads the decision "as holding that the Com-
mission, in a case in which it is alleged that a seller has violated § 2(c) of the
Clayton Act by passing on a reduction in brokerage to favored buyers in the
form of a discriminatory price reduction, may not rely solely on the fact that
the seller has paid less brokerage on the sales at the lower price, but must
establish a causal relationship between the reduced brokerage and the reduced
sales price. The Commission does not, however, acquiese in the opinion of
the Court of Appeals as such, which contains dicta with which the Com-
mission does not necessarily agree. Since the Commission does not believe
that the public interest would be advanced by a further proceeding to estab-
lish whether respondent has violated § 2(c), the complaint must be dis-
missed." BNA ANTITRUST TRADE REG. REP. A-11 (No. 120 Oct. 29, 1963).
' Edward Joseph Hruby, TRADE REG. REP. 16225 (FTC Dkt. 8068,
1963) (order dismissing the complaint).
aEdward Joseph -ruby, TRADE REG. REP. 15709 (FTC Dkt. 8068,
1962).
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functional-competitive level at which he and his wholesaler customers
operated. Being at a higher functional level than the wholesaler he
received no more than the familiar functional discount,3 7 which does
not violate the Robinson-Patman Act in absence of a discrimination
with an accompanying anti-competitive effect.3 Although Commis-
sioner Elman, writing for the majority, made no mention of South-
gate, Commissioner McIntyre in his dissent was quick to point out
that this case was on all fours with Southgate,39 that the economic
justification for such reduction in price had been answered negatively
in Southgate," and that by refusing to follow that decision the Corn-
Sellers who market their products through numerous channels normally
classify buyers as to the distributional function performed; consequently,
prices to these classes, traditionally ranging from retailers through jobbers
to wholesalers, are scaled in accordance with the functions discharged by
each of the groups. For extensive discussion of functional discounts see
Kelly, Functional Discounts under the Robinson-Patman Act, 40 CALIF. L.
REv. 526 (1952). The author notes that functional discounts are not men-
tioned in the Robinson-Patman Act by name, which leads to the assumption
that their validity will depend not on their characterization as such, but on
the prohibitive effect of the legislation on price discrimination in general.
Id. at 529. They are, therefore, subjected to the same tests as other price
differences, in determining whether or not they amount to an unlawful dis-
crimination in price. See FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952);
Standard Motor Prod., Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 826 (1959). Usually there will be an absence of any competitive rela-
tionship among those at the different functional levels, thereby precluding the
possibility of a price discrimination. However, even where an active discrim-
ination is established, the defense of cost-justification will be available to the
party charged therewith, if the functional discounts correctly reflect such
cost savings.
8 Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir.
1951), cert. dismissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952).
"' Edward Joseph Hruby, TRADE REG. REP. 16225 at 21054 (FCT Dkt.
8068, 1963).
"
0 Actually the respondent in Southgate did not base his economic justi-
fication on the fact that as a distributor he warranted a functional discount.
Rather he took the position that since he performed the same services as a
broker, he was entitled to the compensation of a broker. 105 F.2d at 611.
The suggestion has subsequently been made that perhaps he sealed his
doom by calling the allowance that he received "brokerage." If the parties
to the sales of goods had exercised their semantical ingenuity and labelled
the allowance a "distributor's discount," it very possibly would have been
adjudged lawful in that it would have fallen under § 2(a) and thus qualified
as a functional discount. AusThaN, CCH ROBINSON-PATMAx AcT SYmPosI-
um 45 n.41 (1946); 100 U. PA. L. REv. 107, 117 (1951). Cf., fi re Whit-
ney & Co., 273 F.2d 211, 215 (9th Cir. 1959). In Hruby the respondent's
suppliers described the payments or discounts granted to him as "brokerage"
or "discounts in lieu of brokerage." The majority found that these pay-
ments, despite their labels, were in fact functional discounts designed to
permit H-ruby to resell to wholesalers and were not barred by § 2(c). TRADE
REG. REP. 1 16225 at 21051 (FTC Dkt. 8068, 1963).
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mission had in effect fused sections 2(c) and 2(a). 41
The graphic appraisal of the economic exigencies made by the
majority in Hruby42 is the approach that commentators have pleaded
for since the creation of the Southgate doctrine.3  ]:n particular it
places the "buying broker" under the general price discrimination
provisions of section Z(a) and removes him from the more restric-
tive section 2(c) area.4' This is a welcomed consequence for it will
allow intermediaries and distributors of the less conventional type
to solidify their place in the marketing structure, their functional
utility now having been recognized and legally approved. In general
it seems to push wider the already open door in allowing section 2 (a)
principles to be applied to section 2 (c) violations and thus extending
the Broch-Thomasville Chair "new 2(c)" construction. Those who
have maintained that the older rulings and decisions limited the
growth of intermediary functions by giving the independent broker
the preferred position in the distributional hierarchy may now point
to this triumvirate of cases as at least partially reversing the former
disqualifying effect.
One possible argument against interpreting Hruby as furthering
" The dissenter in his enthusiasm to criticize the majority's fusion of
§§2(c) and 2(a) seems to have overlooked (or purposely avoided) the
Thomasville Chair decision which was handed down in August of 1962, some
three months before the final order in Hruby was issued. Had this case been
brought to his attention (assuming he innocently overlooked it), there might
well have been no dissenting opinion.
"' For another price discrimination case, involving problems totally un-
related to those in Hruby, in which Commissioner Elman in a losing cause
took an equally pragmatic approach to the "conviction" of a major oil com-
pany involved in a gas price war, see American Oil Co., TrADi REG. REP.
115961 (FTC Dkt. 8183, 1962). However, the Commission's finding that
American violated § 2(a) when it reduced prices during the seventeen day
gas war to its dealers in one town without granting -similar reductions to its
dealers in an adjoining town was reversed where the evidence showed that
the injury to competition was only minimal and temporary, and that any
economic injury suffered by the nonfavored dealers was not attributable to
price cuts by American, but to price reductions already in effect by other
major brand gasoline suppliers. American Oil Co. v. FTC, TRADE REG. REP.
(1963 Trade Cas.) 9 70948 (7th Cir. Nov. 19, 1963).
"'See AUSTERN, CCH ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT SYMPOsIuM 45 n.41
(1946); AUSTIN, PRIcE DIScRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER
THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 115 (1959); EDWARDS, THE PRicE DIscRIM-
INATION LAW 144-45 (1959); RowE, PicE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE
ROBrNSON-PATMAN Acr 359 (1962); 100 U. PA. L. REv. 107, 117 (1951).
"'This decision echoed precisely the suggestion of two well-versed Rob-
inson-Patman Act lawyers. See AUSTERN, op. cit. supra note 42; AUSTIN,
op cit. supra note 42.
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the demise of section 2(c)'s per se illegality is that Southgate was
"suspect in its inception."4 A thoughtful analysis such as Commis-
sioner Elman made in Hruby would seem to lead to the conclusion
that distributors in the position of Southgate and Hruby should
never have been placed under the canopy of section 2 (c). Without
the discount which this type of distributor receives he could not pos-
sibly remain in business because he is compelled to offer to his
wholesaling customers a price that is competitive with that paid by
them to suppliers who sell through brokers. So analyzed, the serv-
ices rendered would qualify this intermediary for a functional dis-
count.4 This, of course, would mean that any violation of the
Robinson-Patman Act occurring in dealings here would fall under
section 2(a), not section 2(c), and that Southgate was incorrect
in applying 2 (c). 47
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that the Hruby de-
cision is capable of at least two interpretations. The first and more
narrow is reached by reading the decision as the majority saw it-
a 2 (a) case involving trade or functional discounts, 2 (c) having no
application whatsoever.4 s A narrow interpretation is also reached
by reading Hruby as an isolated decision, unrelated to the more
orthodox types of section 2(c) cases, that is, those involving inde-
pendent brokers and direct buyers and their agents.40  However, a
broader application is achieved by interpreting the holding as the
"'As pointed out in the dissenting opinion in Hruby, this was one of the
arguments put forth by respondent in his brief. Impliedly, at least, the ma-jority must have agreed with the statement. TRADE RE(. REP. 16225 at
21054 (FTC Dkt. 8068, 1963).
"Id. at 21050.
,
7 The dissenting commissioner in Hruby, conceding for the sake of argu-
ment that §§ 2(a) and 2(c) were fused, maintained that the respondent had
still violated the Act inasmuch as he had made sales not just to wholesalers
but also to direct buying chain stores. These sales to chains, he argued,
created a price discrimination under § 2(a) because small retailers in com-
petition with these large, direct buying, retailers bought from wholesalers
who received no "discount in lieu of brokerage." Id. at 21055. This argu-
ment is based solely on a factual discrepancy and has no bearing on the more
important §§ 2(c)-2(a) junction aspects of the decision.
"Id. at 21052.
,o This view would form the basis of an argument that the buying broker
type of § 2(c) case is sui generis and, therefore, a merger of §§ 2(c) and
2(a) for this class does not necessarily mean that the same applies in other
types of § 2(c) cases. However, the qualifying dictum of Broch and the de-
cision in Thontasville Chair stand to rebut any such deduction.
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dissent saw it-a fusion of sections 2(a) and 2(c)."" If this be
true, it would seem to be a part of the natural sequence created by
Brock and continued by Thomasville Chair of judicially repealing
section 2(c) as it was originally intended to be construed, which
intent was followed until the recent coup d'etat. Assuming that sec-
tions 2(a) and 2(c) have been fused-and certainly this is a sup-
portable position to take-immediately the question is raised of what
will be the ultimate result of such fusion. For example, it is con-
ceivable that as a part of this natural sequence section 2(b),51 the
"meeting competition" proviso, will also be united with section 2 (c).
This would seem to be a tenable prediction because section 2(b) is
always applicable as a defense where a section 2(a) violation is
charged,52 and if section 2(a) is now to be read with section 2(c),
it would seem to follow that so should section 2(b).
At first blush a potential criticism of the Broch-Thomasville
Chair-Hruby rationale is that it impiously disregards the Con-
gressional intent upon which section 2(c) is based, but the obvious
answer to this is that the brokerage clause was enacted primarily to
make illegal illusory and unearned brokerage payments and discounts
in lieu thereof and not to so warp our economy as to stifle competi-
tion and produce conflicts with the broader antitrust principles em-
bodied in the Sherman, Clayton and Federal Trade Commission
Acts. 8 Against the backdrop of the recent decisions discussed here,
it is likely that there will be an enlargement of the realistic pattern
they have created, thereby giving legitimate distributional functions
and services their deserved place in our economy without the ever
TRADE REG. REP. 16225 at 21055 (FTC Dkt. 8068, 1963).149 Stat. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1958). For the pertinent
part of this section, see note 10 supra, and for a general discussion of the
intricacies involved in the application of § 2(b) to prima facie violations of
the Act, see EDwA.Rns, THE PRcIE DISCRIMINATION LAW ch. 17 (1959);
RowiE, PRIcE DIScRimiNATION UNDER THE RoBINsO N-PATMAN ACT ch. 9(1962); 66 YALE L. J. 935 (1957).
" See, e.g., Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945).
"' The case law, as it stands now, is in the process of judicially recon-
structing § 2(c), which the Attorney General's Committee did not think was
possible because of the unanimity of court decisions under the existing inter-
pretations. See Ar'y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 192-93 (1955).
Although the committee's opinion has proved to be incorrect, it would seem
that its recommendation for legislation in this area is still sound, due to
the uncertainties that remain in the wake of the recent decisions.
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lingering, ominous cloud of illegality under the Robinson-Patman
Act.
JAMES M. TALLEY, JR.
Sales-Implied Warranty-Cigarette Manufacturer's
Liability for Lung Cancer
Plaintiff's decedent initiated suit in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida to recover damages for
personal injuries resulting from lung cancer allegedly incurred by
smoking Lucky Strike cigarettes. Shortly thereafter, he died from
this condition and this claim1 was consolidated with another brought
under the Florida wrongful death statute.' The district court sub-
mitted the case to the jury on theories of negligence and breach of
implied warranty.' In addition to rendering a general verdict for
defendant, the jury answered specific interrogatories4 to the effect
that the fatal lung cancer was proximately caused by the smoking of
Lucky Strikes and that, as of the time of the discovery of the cancer,
defendant could not by the reasonable application of human skill and
foresight have known of the danger to users of his product. Judg-
ment was entered for defendant, and on appeal the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed,5 holding defendant not liable as an in-
'Under Florida survival law, decedent's claim passed to the executor
of his estate. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 45.11 (Supp. 1962).
'FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 768.01, .02 (1959).
'The complaint asserted liability under six separate counts: breach of
implied warranty; breach of express warranty; negligence; misrepresenta-
tion; battery; and violation of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,
52 Stat. 1040 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1958), the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77(1958), and the Florida Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 500.01 (1962). The trial court directed verdict for defendant on all ex-
cept the implied warranty and negligence counts.
'The questions submitted and answered were: "(1) Did the decedent
Green have primary cancer in his leift'lung? [Answered, YES] ....(2) Was the cancer in his left lung the cause or one of the causes of his
death? [Answered, YES] .... (3) Was the smoking of Lucky Strike ciga-
rettes on the part of the decedent, Green, a proximate cause or one of the
proximate causes of the development of cancer in his left lung? [Answered,
YES] .... (4) Could the defendant on, or prior to, February 1, 1956, by
the reasonable application of human skill and foresight have known that users
of Lucky Strike cigarettes, such as the decedent Green would be endangered,
by the inhalation of the main stream smoke from Lucky Strike cigarettes,
of contracting cancer of the lung? [Answered, NO] .... " Green v. Ameri-
can* Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70, 71-72 (5th Cir. 1962).
' Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962).
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